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ARBITRATION
INTRODUCTION
During the survey period between September 1994 and September 1995,
the Tenth Circuit decided four arbitration cases. Two of these cases have fairly
narrow consequences because they concern arbitration only in the securities
industry. In Metz v. Merrill Lynch,' the court held that Title VII claims must
be arbitrated pursuant to an arbitration clause contained in an agreement be-
tween a broker and the National Securities Dealers Association.2 In Kelley v.
Michaels,3 the court extended the authority of arbitrators by allowing them to
award punitive damages under a contract containing conflicting choice of law
and arbitration clauses on punitive awards.4
The two cases involving arbitration outside the securities industry have
broader implications. In Coors Brewing Co. v. Molson Breweries,5 the court
refined the scope of arbitration agreements by holding that "arising in connec-
tion with" language mandates arbitration of disputes sufficiently connected to a
contract containing an arbitration agreement.6 In ARW Exploration Corp. v.
Aguirre,7 the court held that an arbitrator may not use the alter ego principle'
to compel nonparties to arbitrate because only the court, not the arbitrator,
may compel a party to arbitrate. 9
This Survey first presents background information on each of these recent
cases. It then discusses the decisions and analyzes their ramifications. The
Survey examines the holdings of these cases in light of similar decisions by
other circuits and offers some explanation of the rationale behind the deci-
sions.
I. ARBITRATION IN THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY
Arbitration, used in the securities industry for over a century, 0 has be-
come an important part of the trade, with approximately 6,600 cases submitted
to arbitration per year." Arbitration resolves disputes between securities
1. 39 F.3d 1482 (10th Cir. 1994).
2. Metz, 39 F.3d at 1487-88.
3. 59 F.3d 1050 (10th Cir. 1995).
4. Kelley, 59 F. 3d at 1055.
5. 51 F.3d 1511 (l0th Cir. 1995).
6. Molson, 51 F.3d at 1515.
7. 45 F.3d 1455 (10th Cir. 1995).
8. See infra notes 160-67 and accompanying text.
9. ARW Exploration Corp., 45 F.3d at 1460-61.
10. Amy Hutner, U.S. General Accounting Office Report Re Employment Discrimination:
How Registered Representatives Fare in Discrimination Disputes, in SEcURrIES ARBITRATION
1994, at 453 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. 852, 1994).
11. Martin L. Budd, Securities Industry Arbitration-Recent Issues, C977 ALI-ABA 205,
207 (1995).
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firms, between firms and customers, and between firms and their employ-
ees. 2 While the American Arbitration Association handles eight to ten per-
cent of the cases, the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) man-
ages the majority of cases.'3
A. Employee Statutory Rights in the Securities Industry
1. Background
In some instances, the increasingly broad scope of arbitration 4 intersects
with a large assortment of federal statutory rights for employees. 5 For exam-
ple, under Title VII, which prohibits employment discrimination and encourag-
es equal employment opportunities, 6 an employee may pursue remedies in
several forums. 7 These include state and local agencies and the federal
courts. 8 Title VII and arbitration intersect because the right to a jury trial
granted by Title VII does not render a claim inappropriate for arbitration.'
The statutory right to a judicial forum clashes with contractual rights stem-
ming from contractual language that mandates an arbitral forum.
The securities industry routinely utilizes arbitration clauses. For example,
when a brokerage house employs a securities broker as a registered representa-
tive,2" industry regulatory organizations require the broker to sign a "Uniform
Application for Securities and Commodities Industry Representative and/or
Agent Form."'" The form, a private agreement between the employee and the
regulatory organization, contains a clause requiring arbitration of disputes
between the employee broker and the employer brokerage firm.2 2 An
12. Hutner, supra note 10, at 451.
13. Budd, supra note 11, at 207.
14. In the mid-to-late 1980s, a series of Supreme Court cases significantly expanded the
scope of arbitrable disputes, including claims based on statutory rights. Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (holding that a statutory claim must be
arbitrated under a predispute arbitration agreement unless the agreement was the result of fraud or
the arbitration would undermine the statutory right); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (stating that an agreement to arbitrate future statutory claims must
be enforced under the Federal Arbitration Act, absent a clear congressional intent to the contrary,
which may be inferred if the statute's underlying purpose conflicts with arbitration); Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (explaining that an interna-
tional agreement containing a broad arbitration clause subjects antitrust claims to arbitration).
15. IAN R. MACNEIL Er AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 16.5.1.1 (1994). Other statutori-
ly-created employee rights include those granted by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988); the Employee Retirement Income Security Program Act of
1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988); and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§
201-219 (1988).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1988).
17. Id. § 200oe-5(f)(3).
18. Id.
19. Nghiem v. NEC Elec., Inc., 25 F.3d 1437, 1441 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
638 (1994).
20. Registered representatives are firm employees who deal with customers' buy-sell orders.
Hutner, supra note 10, at 451.
21. MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 15, § 13.3.3.
22. Id. Though brokerage firms require that brokers with the firm register with one of the
regulatory organizations such as NASD, the registration applications do not fall under the Federal
Arbitration Act § I employment exception because the applications are not employment contracts.
id. at § 16.5.3.1; see also Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 312 (6th Cir. 1991)
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employee may nevertheless seek to avoid arbitration of statutory claims based
on a public policy argument,23 citing the inadequacy of arbitration to address
statutory rights.24
A landmark arbitration case, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,2
opened the door to mandated arbitration of statutory claims and severely cur-
tailed the public policy argument.26 In Gilmer, pursuant to an arbitration
clause contained in a broker's representative application, the U.S. Supreme
Court decided that a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Ace7 (ADEA) was subject to mandatory arbitration." The Fifth Circuit ex-
tended the reach of Gilmer by holding that a broker's Title VII claim must be
arbitrated. 9 A broad reading of Gilmer permits arbitration of any statutory
claim when an employment contract contains an arbitration agreement."
When determining whether to mandate arbitration of statutory claims,
courts tend to apply Gilmer mechanically and compel arbitration.3 Although
(explaining that an arbitration agreement contained in a securities registration agreement does not
fall under the FAA § I contract of employment exception).
23. MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 15, § 13.3.4.
24. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56-57 (1974) (holding that Title VII
claims are not suitable for arbitration). As an informal procedure, arbitration is inappropriate to
deal with statutory rights due to inadequate fact finding, procedural inadequacies, and the like-
lihood of a decision based on the parties' agreement rather than the statute or application of in-
dustry standards rather than law. Id. But see Patrick 0. Gudridge, Title VII Arbitration, 16 BERKE-
LEY J. EMPLOYMENT & LAB. L. 209, 210 n.4 (1995) ("At minimum, it might be thought, the
Gardner-Denver line is no longer relevant outside the collective bargaining context."). See gener-
ally MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 15, § 11.6 (stating that the public policy defense is most often
available in a collective bargaining context).
25. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
26. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
27. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
28. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27. The Court rejected the employee's broad policy argument that
compulsory arbitration does not comport with the underlying purpose of the ADEA. Id. at 26-27.
The decision also rested in part on the Federal Arbitration Act's policy favoring arbitration. Id. at
25 (citing Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)
(explaining that the FAA "establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the
scope of arbitral issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration")). Another important aspect of
Gilmer lies in the Court's discussion of Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
The Court stated that Alexander involved arbitration in a collective bargaining context and was not
decided under the FAA. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 22. By distinguishing Alexander in this manner, the
Court created two lines of cases regarding the appropriateness of arbitrating statutory claims. For a
discussion of Tenth Circuit decisions on collective bargaining arbitration, see Kerri M. Pertcheck,
Arbitration Survey, 72 DENY. U. L. REV. 571 (1995). See generally Stephen W. Skrainka, The
Utility of Arbitration Agreements in Employment Manuals and Collective Bargaining Agreements
for Resolving Civil Rights, Age and ADA Claims, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 985 (1993) (discussing the
role of arbitration in the collective bargaining context).
29. Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991) (concluding that
"[b]ecause both the ADEA and Title VII are similar civil rights statutes, and both are enforced by
the EEOC ... we have little trouble concluding that Title VII claims can be subjected to compul-
sory arbitration"). This case is especially relevant because of its importance to the court's decision
in Metz, discussed infra notes 34-48 and accompanying text.
30. Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential Perspec-
tive on Labor and Employment Arbitration from the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer, 44 HASTINGS
LJ. 1187, 1189 (1993). Scholars, however, express wariness regarding arbitration of all statutory
claims because arbitration may resolve controversies based on nonlegal social values rather than
the law. Additionally, judicial forums are more suited to choose between conflicting public values
inherent in statutory claims. Id.
31. Id. at 1202; see Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932, 935 (9th Cir.
1996]
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some circuits have foreclosed the arbitration of Title VII claims based on ar-
bitration agreements in a securities registration,32 the majority of circuits re-
quire it.
33
2. Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
3 4
a. Facts
Kelli Lyn Metz, an employee of Merrill Lynch, registered as a broker
with NASD.3" An arbitration clause in the registration application required
Metz to arbitrate all disputes or claims with Merrill Lynch.36 Upon termina-
tion, Metz filed a district court complaint alleging Title VII violations. 7
Merrill Lynch responded with a motion to compel arbitration and stay court
proceedings.38 The district court held that the Title VII claims were not sub-
ject to compulsory arbitration.39 Merrill Lynch's motion to reconsider was
denied, and the company requested dismissal of a subsequent interlocutory
1992); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 307 (6th Cir. 1991); Alford v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991).
32. Farrand v. Lutheran Bhd., 993 F.2d 1253, 1255 (7th Cit. 1993) (concluding that the lan-
guage of the arbitration agreement does not require the arbitration of disputes between NASD
members and a registered representative of the member); Utley v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 883
F.2d 184, 187 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating that based on the text of Title VII and congressional intent,
an employee cannot be required to arbitrate prior to a judicial hearing); Swenson v. Management
Recruiters Int'l, 858 F.2d 1304, 1307 (8th Cir. 1988) (explaining that Title VII promotes public
interest and arbitration may hamper this effort).
33. Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698, 700 (1 1th Cir. 1992) (stating the
plaintiff did not waive the right to a judicial forum since the dispute may be pursued in arbitration
and if those proceedings are legally deficient, the plaintiff may move for judicial review); Mago v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932, 935 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that in a private agree-
ment containing an arbitration clause, plaintiff did not meet the burden of showing congressional
intent to preclude Title VII arbitration because the purpose of Title VII is similar to that of the
ADEA); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 312 (6th Cir. 1991) (explaining that
an arbitration agreement contained in a securities registration agreement does not fall under the
FAA § 1 contract of employment exception and must therefore stand); Alford v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that Title VII claims, like ADEA
claims, are subject to arbitration under the FAA).
34. 39 F.3d 1482 (10th Cir. 1994).
35. Metz, 39 F.3d at 1485-86. Brokerage firms normally require brokers to register with a
regulatory organization. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
36. Metz, 39 F.3d at 1486. By registering with NASD, Metz agreed to abide by all NASD
rules. Metz v. Merrill Lynch, No. CIV-89-1548-P, 1990 WL 68532, at *1 (W.D. Okla. 1990). The
NASD Manual, 3744, states:
It may be deemed conduct inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade and a
violation of Article III, Section 1 of the Rules of Fair Practice for a member or a person
associated with a member to fail to submit a dispute for arbitration under the Code of
Arbitration Procedure as required by that Code ....
Metz, 39 F.3d at 1488 n.6.
37. Metz, 39 F.3d at 1485-86. Already on probation for poor performance, Metz informed
management of her pregnancy. Id. Her immediate supervisor told Metz that women returning from
maternity leave often did not adequately perform their duties or failed to return at all. Id. Typi-
cally, the brokers decided how to distribute their accounts during a leave. Id. In this case, howev-
er, Metz's supervisor told her that he would make that decision. Id. Within two weeks, Metz and
her supervisor argued about one of Metz's accounts. Id. Metz was fired shortly thereafter. Id. The





appeal, citing multiple circuit court decisions holding that Title VII claims do
not have to be arbitratedi'
After the bench trial resulted in a $53,747 judgment for Metz on the Title
VII claim, Merrill Lynch filed a motion to vacate the judgment and sought to
compel arbitration of the Title VII claim. 4' The company based the motion to
vacate on a change in the law that occurred after the dismissal of the interloc-
utory appeal. 4' The district court denied the motion to vacate, denied a subse-
quent motion for reconsideration, and Merrill Lynch filed an appeal in the
Tenth Circuit.43
b. Decision
Relying on the Supreme Court's enforcement of the arbitration clause in
Gilmer, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Metz must arbitrate her Title VII
claim. 4 As an alternative to her main contention that Title VII claims do not
have to be arbitrated, Metz argued that FAA section 1 precluded arbitration
even if the Title VII claims were subject to mandatory arbitration. 4 FAA
section 1, however, does not apply to arbitration clauses contained in a regis-
tration application'8 and Metz's duty to arbitrate arose from her broker regis-
tration with NASD, not the employment contract with Merrill Lynch.47 As a




42. Id. In Alford v. Dean Witrer Reynolds, Inc., decided after Merrill Lynch sought dismissal
of the appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that Title VII claims may be subject to compulsory arbitration.
Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991).
43. Metz, 39 F.3d at 1486.
44. Id. at 1487. The court based much of its reasoning on the similar purposes of the ADEA
and Title VII. "Congress closely modeled the ADEA upon Title VII and [the two] statutes are
similar both in their aims and in their substantive prohibitions." Id. (quoting Cooper v. Asplundh
Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544, 1553-54 (10th Cir. 1988)).
45. Id. at 1488. FAA § I provides in part that "nothing herein contained shall apply to con-
tracts of employment of ... workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1
(1994).
46. Metz, 39 F.3d at 1488. The Metz court relied on Gilmer.
[I]t would be inappropriate to address the scope of... [FAA] § I exclusion because the
arbitration clause being enforced here is not contained in a contract of employment ....
The record before us does not show, and the parties do not contend, that Gilmer's em-
ployment agreement with Interstate contained a written arbitration clause. Rather, the
arbitration clause at issue is in Gilmer's security registration application, which is a
contract with the securities exchange, not with Interstate. The lower courts addressing
the issue uniformly have concluded that the exclusionary clause of § I of FAA is inap-
plicable to arbitration clauses contained in such registration application.
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2.
47. Id.
48. Metz, 39 F.3d at 1488. Although generally holding that Merrill Lynch has the right to
compel Metz to arbitrate her Title VII claims, the court further found that in this specific instance,
Merrill Lynch waived that right by failing to renew its final demand for arbitration in a timely
manner. Id. at 1490.
1996]
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3. Analysis
Regardless of the advantages of arbitration,"9 employees fear that manda-
tory arbitration of statutory claims forces 'them to relinquish their statutory
rights.50 By allowing mandatory arbitration of statutory rights, courts permit
employers to condition employment on the relinquishment of these rights.
Thus, through mandatory arbitration policies, business entities may escape the
requirements of regulatory legislation."
Attorney awareness of the potential consequences of entering into such
agreements reduces the risk that an employee will inadvertently waive statuto-
ry rights. Unequal bargaining power, however, makes it difficult to address
this risk regardless of the attorney's awareness. Employees have little chance
of influencing boilerplate language, such as the language contained in the
NASD arbitration clause. Unfortunately, the realities of the job market indicate
that employees will continue to sacrifice their right to a judicial forum in order
to obtain or retain employment.
4. Other Circuits 2
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits recently addressed mandatory arbitration of
Title VII claims based on arbitration agreements contained in securities regis-
tration applications. 3 Both of these cases were decided by circuit courts that
previously upheld mandatory arbitration of Title VII claims.5 4 The cases fur-
ther develop and refine the law surrounding mandatory arbitration of employ-
ment issues.
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Williams v. Cigna Financial Advisors55
differs from Metz in that the employee joined the brokerage firm before the
NASD arbitration rules included employment disputes. 6 But because the
49. "Speed, lower costs, informality, the ability to gain a more suitable neutral
decisionmaker, and privacy are the advantages usually cited in support of arbitration. Many of
arbitration's alleged advantages result from the autonomy parties gain when they decide to arbi-
trate rather than go to court." LEONARD L. RisKIN & JAMEs E. WESTBROOK, DisPuTE RESOLU-
TION AND LAWYERS 297 (1987).
50. Patrick D. Smith, Comment, Arbitration--The Court Opens the Door to Arbitration of
Employment Disputes: Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 17 J. CORP. L. 865, 865 (1992);
see, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56 (1974).
51. MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 15, § 16.5.4.1. For a general discussion of considerations in
employer-drafted mandatory arbitration policies, see Garry G. Mathiason & Pavneet S. Uppal,
Evaluating and Using Employer-Initiated Arbitration Policies and Agreements: Preparing the
Workplace for the Twenty-First Century, C902 ALI-ABA 875 (1994).
52. The "Other Circuits" sections of this Survey discusses only federal circuit court cases
decided within the survey period of September 1994 to September 1995.
53. Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, Inc., 56 F.3d 656 (5th Cir. 1995); Prudential Ins. Co.
of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994).
54. The court in Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991), found
that Title VII claims, based on their similarity to ADEA claims, are subject to arbitration under
the FAA. Id. at 230. The court in Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc., 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir.
1992), found that the plaintiff did not meet her burden of showing that Congress intended to pre-
clude Title VII arbitration because the purpose of Title VII corresponds to that of the ADEA. Id.
at 935.
55. 56 F.3d 656 (5th Cir. 1995).
56. Williams, 56 F.3d at 659. The opinion also addressed a second contention that the em-
ployee did not knowingly and voluntarily surrender his right to a judicial forum, based on the
[Vol. 73:3
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employee signed a second registration after the amendment of the NASD
securities registration, the court held that he had agreed to arbitrate employ-
ment claims." By requiring the employee to arbitrate his Title VII claim, the
Fifth Circuit Court extended the reach of mandatory arbitration for Title VII
claims to the securities industry.
The Ninth Circuit, in contrast, restricted compulsory arbitration of Title
VII claims in the securities industry in Prudential Insurance Company of
America v. Lai.5" The Lai court held that brokerage firm employees cannot be
subject to mandatory arbitration of Title VII claims without a "knowing"
waiver of statutory remedies." The decision relied on two factors.' First,
the court held that Congress intended that the waiver of statutory rights result
only from a knowing agreement to arbitrate employment disputes.6 In Lai,
the registration application did not specifically describe the controversies cov-
ered under the arbitration clause.62 As a result, the employees did not know-
ingly surrender statutory remedies and could not be forced to arbitrate Title
VII claims.63
Second, the court recognized that the public policies underlying Title VII
deserve at least as much recognition as the FAA's arbitration policy.' The
court noted that arbitral forums, especially in sexual harassment cases, may
not be appropriate.65
Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1) (1994). The Older Workers Benefit
Protection Act (OWBPA) requires a written waiver of statutory rights. The court determined that
the OWBPA did not apply here because it primarily involves waiver of claims and rights under
the statute rather than waiver of judicial forums. Williams, 56 F.3d at 660.
57. Williams, 56 F.3d at 658.
58. 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994).
59. Prudential Ins. Co., 42 F.3d at 1304-05.
60. Id. In making this decision, the court relied heavily on Alexander, although it is normally
applied in a collective bargaining context. See supra note 28.
61. Prudential Ins. Co., 42 F.3d at 1304. According to a House of Representatives' report,
Congress intended to "encourage[] the use of alternative means of dispute resolution ... where
appropriate" and that alternative dispute resolution should "supplement, not supplant" the remedies
provided by Title VII. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), reprinted in
1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 635). In fact, Senator Dole specifically stated that arbitration should be
endorsed only "where the parties knowingly and voluntarily elect to use these methods." Id. at
1305 (quoting 137 CONG. REc. S15,472, S15,478 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Dole)).
62. Id. at 1302. The registration agreement stated, "I agree to arbitrate any dispute, claim or
controversy that may arise between me or my firm ... that is required to be arbitrated under the
rules, constitutions, or bylaws of the organizations with which I register." Id. The NASD Manual,
in turn, requires that "[any dispute, claim or controversy eligible for submission under Part I of
this Code between or among members and/or associated persons... arising in connection with
the business of such member(s) or in connection with the activities of such associated person(s),
shall be arbitrated under this Code .... Id. (quoting NASD Manual, Code of Arbitration Proce-
dure, 3708).
63. Id. at 1305. In addition, the employees did not receive a copy of the NASD Manual. Id.
at 1303. However, even if they had, the court found the language would not give them notice that
they must arbitrate Title VII claims. Id. at 1305.
64. Id.
65. Id. "[Iln an area as personal and emotionally charged as sexual harassment and discrimi-
nation, the procedural right to a hearing before a jury of one's peers, rather than a [NASD arbitra-
tion] panel ... may be especially important." Id. at 1305 n.4.
1996]
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B. Punitive Damages in Securities Arbitration
1. Background
As arbitrators' authority to decide substantive disputes continues to ex-
pand, their power to award punitive damages becomes increasingly important,
especially in the securities industry.' At one time the securities industry actu-
ally encouraged the use of arbitration, in part to avoid large jury awards.67
Brokers now complain, however, about arbitrators' power to make punitive
awards and the narrow grounds available to appeal such awards.'
Agreements routinely used in the securities industry often designate,
through choice of law clauses, the use of New York state law. Unlike most
states, New York does not allow arbitrators to grant punitive awards.' In the
same agreement, parties may agree to use certain arbitration rules, such as
those of the American Arbitration Association or NASD, which impliedly do
permit such awards." As a result, the arbitration clause may be inherently
contradictory.7 To further complicate an already complex situation, the FAA
does not directly address the propriety of arbitral punitive damage awards.72
Until recently, to determine if a particular arbitrator had the power to
award punitive damages, a court had to resolve the conflict between federal
law and divergent state laws by determining whether the FAA preempts state
law prohibiting punitive awards by arbitrators." Lacking guidance from the
Supreme Court, the Second and Seventh Circuits applied state law74 while
other circuits applied federal law." The Supreme Court resolved the circuit
courts' inconsistency by redefining the analysis of arbitrator-awarded punitive
damages in Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.76
The Mastrobuono Court precluded use of the New York rule by finding
that if parties agree to arbitrate punitive damages, the FAA dictates
66. BERTHOLD H. HOENIGER, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION HANDBOOK app. 7 at 7-2 (1990).
67. J. Stratton Shartel, The Time Is Right for Limits on Punitive Damages in Securities Arbi-
tration Cases, INSIDE LITIG., Nov. 1994, at 2, 2.
68. Id.
69. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793, 794 (N.Y. 1976) (stating that the arbitrator
has no power to award punitive damages because it would violate public policy). The Second and
Seventh Circuits applied the "New York Rule" and vacated the arbitral awards of punitive damag-
es. Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc., 948 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1991); Fahnestock & Co. v.
Waltman, 935 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1991); Pierson v. Dean, Witter, Reynolds, Inc., 742 F.2d 334 (7th
Cir. 1984). Not coincidentally, the jurisdiction of these two circuits includes New York City and
Chicago, major hubs for the securities industry.
70. Kenneth R. Davis, A Proposed Framework for Reviewing Punitive Damages Awards of
Commercial Arbitrators, 58 ALB. L. REv. 55, 55 (1994).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 57.
73. Anthony M. Sabino, Awarding Punitive Damages in Securities Industry Arbitration:
Working for a Just Result, 27 U. RICH. L. REv. 33, 33-34 (1992).
74. See Davis, supra note 70.
75. Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 1994); Lee v. Chica,
983 F.2d 883 (8th Cir. 1993); Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir.
1991); Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Sys., 882 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1989); Bonar v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378 (lth Cir. 1988); Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v.
Kajima Int'l, 598 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ala. 1984), affid, 776 F.2d 269 (11th Cir. 1985).
76. 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995).
(Vol. 73:3
19961 ARBITRATION
enforcement of the contract even if state law does not allow punitive damag-
es.' The customer/broker agreement in Mastrobuono stated that the inherent-
ly conflicting New York law and NASD rules would apply to the agree-
ment.7" To determine if the arbitration agreement reflected an implicit intent
by the parties to include or exclude punitive damages, the choice of law and
arbitration provisions first must be considered separately, and then construed
as a whole.79 Taken separately, neither clause precluded punitive damages.0
Taken together, the provisions conflicted."' The Court concluded that New
York law would apply to the contract in general, but not to the provisions of
the arbitration clause. 2
2. Kelley v. Michaels3
a. Facts
William Michaels, a broker with PaineWebber, handled two accounts for
the Kelleys. The Kelleys entered into a Resource Management Account Agree-
ment covering each account.8 4 One year later, in October 1989, Michaels left
77. Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1217 (emphasis added). The FAA ensures that "private
agreements are enforced according to their terms." Id. (citing Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v.
Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989)).
78. Id. at 1214-15. Before Mastrobuono, New York law did not allow arbitrators to make
punitive awards. Garrity, 353 N.E.2d at 794. NASD, however, does allow such awards. See infra
note 107 and accompanying text.
79. Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1217. The court in Mastrobuono interpreted the choice of
law provision as a substitute for a conflict of laws analysis that otherwise would determine what
law should be applied. Id. As such, the clause did not unequivocally preclude a punitive damages
claim. Id. The arbitration clause, on the other hand, strongly suggested the appropriateness of
punitive damages because it explicitly authorized arbitration under the NASD rules. Id. at 1218.
The NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure, in turn, states that arbitrators may award "damages and
other relief." NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure I[ 3741(e) (1993). The court interpreted this
broad provision to encompass punitive damages. Id. Moreover, the NASD Arbitrator's Manual
states that an arbitrator may make punitive awards. Id.
80. Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1218.
81. Id.
82. Id. The Court stated:
[T]he best way to harmonize the choice of law provision with the arbitration provision is
to read "the laws of the State of New York" to encompass substantive principles that
New York courts would apply, but not to include special rules limiting the authority of
arbitrators. Thus, the choice of law provision covers the rights and duties of the parties,
while the arbitration clause covers arbitration; neither sentence intrudes upon the other.
Id. at 1219.
The Court employed fundamental contract principles when applying the second prong of
the test-analyzing the meaning of the provisions taken together. The choice of law clause created
ambiguity in an agreement that otherwise permits punitive damages: such ambiguities in the scope
of an arbitration agreement are resolved in favor of arbitration. Id. at 1218 (citing Volt Info. Sci-
ences, Inc., 489 U.S. at 476); see also Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983). Additionally, common law contract principles dictate that any ambiguity
be construed against the drafter. Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1219. Finally, if the choice of law
and arbitration clauses contradict, as asserted by Shearson-Lehman, the agreement violated another
cardinal rule of contract construction requiring an interpretation that gives effect to all provisions
and renders them consistent with one another. Id. Justice Thomas dissented, stating that the intent
to preclude punitive damages was made clear through the choice of law clause because New York
law explicitly prohibits arbitrators from awarding punitive damages while NASD rules merely im-
plicitly allow such awards. Id. at 1223 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
83. 59 F.3d 1050 (10th Cir. 1995).
84. Kelley, 59 F.3d at 1051-52. Paragraph 12 of the PaineWebber agreement provided: "This
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PaineWebber and joined Merrill Lynch, taking the Kelleys' accounts with
him.85 The Kelleys again signed Customer Agreements covering each ac-
count. 6 In 1991, their attorney sent Michaels a demand letter alleging churn-
ing,8" unauthorized trading, unsuitable investments leading to portfolio losses,
and needless liquidating commissions.88 They settled with Merrill Lynch for
$290,000 but the agreement specifically left open the possibility of pursuing
claims against Michaels individually.
The Kelleys filed a state action against Michaels alleging stockbroker
fraud and federal securities violations.9 The Kelleys dismissed the suit with-
out prejudice after Michaels removed it to federal court.9' The Kelleys filed a
second state action which did not include the federal securities allegations.
9 2
When Michaels sought to compel arbitration, the Kelleys dismissed the second
action without prejudice and instead filed a claim with NASD.93 The NASD
claim alleged breach of fiduciary duty, churning, unsuitable investments, and
negligence. The Kelleys sought both actual and punitive damages from
Michaels. 94 The arbitrators awarded the Kelleys $292,750 in actual damages
and $505,217.50 in punitive damages.95 After the Kelleys confirmed the
award in federal district court, Michaels appealed."
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the arbitral award of punitive damages.9"
agreement and its enforcement shall be construed and governed by the laws of the State of New
York." Id. at 1052. Paragraph 15 of the agreement provided in part:
I agree... that all controversies which may arise between you and me . . . concerning
any transactions ... shall be determined by arbitration. Any arbitration shall be in accor-
dance with the rules in effect of either the New York Stock Exchange, Inc., American
Stock Exchange, Inc., [or] National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc....
Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. Paragraph 12 of the Merrill Lynch agreement stated in part: "This Agreement...
will be governed by and interpreted under the laws of the State of New York." Id. Paragraph 11
of the agreement stated in part:
I agree that all controversies which may arise between us ... shall be determined by
arbitration. Any arbitration under this agreement shall be conducted only before the New
York Stock Exchange, Inc., the American Stock Exchange, Inc ... the National Asso-
ciation of Securities Dealers, Inc ... and in accordance with its arbitration rules then in
force.
Id.
87. "Churning" occurs when a broker engages in transactions to generate unjustifiable com-
missions from the customer's loss or transaction costs. THOMAS L. HAzEN, THE LAW OF SECURI-
TIEs REGULATION § 10.10 (2d ed. 1990).
88. Kelley, 59 F.3d at 1052. Michaels charged for the commissions when transferring the
Kelleys' accounts from PaineWebber to Merrill Lynch. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1052-53.
92. Id. at 1053.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1051.
96. Id. at 1053.
97. Id. at 1050. The court rejected Michaels's arguments that (1) the arbitrators exceeded
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First, the court determined that in awarding punitive damages, the arbitration
panel did not reach outside the specific claims made by the Kelleys." The
Kelleys' second state action clearly requested punitive damages for Michaels's
conduct while at Merrill Lynch."
Second, the court addressed whether the PaineWebber agreement or the
Merrill Lynch agreement precluded an award of punitive damages."re Both
agreements provided for arbitration in accordance with NASD rules, which do
not preclude the possibility of punitive damages.'0 ' Both agreements, howev-
er, also provided for enforcement under New York state law, which does not
allow arbitrators to award punitive damages. In light of the Supreme Court's
holding in Mastrobuono, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the punitive damag-
es award was proper.'0 2
3. Analysis
Many brokerage agreements contain New York choice of law clauses.
0 3
As a result, Mastrobuono and its progeny, including Kelley, have far-reaching
implications in the securities industry. 4 It is unlikely, however, that the de-
cision will extend beyond the securities context because of the unique nature
of securities arbitration.0 5 To preclude arbitral punitive damages awards in
the future, brokerage houses may attempt to draft documents more carefully,
specifically precluding punitive damages awards."° The NASD, however,
has attempted to divert this result by enacting a rule prohibiting its members
from drafting agreements that preclude arbitral awards of punitive damages."
their authority because the Kelleys did not request punitive damages for Michaels's conduct while
at Merrill Lynch; (2) the punitive damages award went against the choice of law clause; and (3)
the award was excessive. Id. at 1051.
98. Id. at 1054. Michaels argued on appeal that because the language of the Demand for
Relief did not specifically mention punitive damages for conduct while at Merrill Lynch, the arbi-
trators went beyond their authority. The court, in rejecting this reasoning, stated that the relief
requested fairly sought punitive damages from Michaels, regardless of his place of employment.
The Demand for Relief in the NASD claim, which formed the basis of the arbitrator's award, stat-
ed: "Based upon the foregoing, Claimants are entitled to the following relief: From PaineWebber
and Michaels: a. Actual damages of $30,000; b. Interest as allowed by law; [and] c. Punitive dam-
ages in an amount that will deter others from doing what Respondent did to Claimants." Id. at
1054 n.3. The arbitration panel, paraphrasing the Demand for Relief, stated, "Claimants requested
actual damages in the amount of $30,000.00, interest as allowed by law, punitive damages, legal
fees, and costs against PaineWebber and Michaels." Id. at 1054.
99. Id. These allegations were incorporated into the NASD claim because the Kelleys dis-
missed that action in deference to the arbitration. Id.
100. Id. Michaels based his argument on the choice of law clause in the brokerage agree-
ments: New York law does not allow arbitrators to award punitive damages. Id. (citing Garrity v.
Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976)). Mastrobuono, directly on point, disposed of this
argument. Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. 1212, 1218; see supra text accompanying notes 73-82.
101. Kelley, 59 F.3d at 1054; see CODE OF ARBrrRATION PROCEDURE pt. 1, para. 3741 (Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers 1995).
102. Kelley, 59 F.3d at 1055.
103. See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
104. Carroll E. Neeseman & Maren E. Nelson, The Law of Securities Arbitration, in SECU-
RITtES ARBrrRATION: 1995, at 263 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. 899,
1995).
105. Id.
106. Isham R. Jones, III, Exemplary Awards in Securities Arbitration: Short-Circuited Rights
to Punitive Damages, 1995 J. DiSP. RFSOL. 129, 152.
107. RuLEs OF FAR PRACrIcE Rule 21(f)(4) (National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.
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4. Other Circuits
Two other circuits, following the Mastrobuono/Kelley reasoning, recently
addressed the power of arbitrators to award punitive damages in securities
disputes. The Seventh Circuit, in Smith Barney Inc. v. Schell,' held that an
arbitration agreement identical to that in Mastrobuono dictated reversing a
district court's injunction preventing an arbitration panel from considering
punitive damage claims." 9 Similarly, in Davis v. Prudential Securities,
Inc.," o the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the arbitrator's authority included
awarding punitive damages."' The arbitration clause in Davis was also virtu-
ally identical to that in Mastrobuono."2 These cases, like Kelley, did little to
augment the basic holding in Mastrobuono given the similarities of the lan-
guage used in each of the four contracts.
II. SCOPE OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
A. Background
When construing arbitration clauses, courts often cast them as "broad" or
"narrow.""' Interpretation of the scope of an arbitration clause determines
what issues will be arbitrated." ' A broad clause"5 subjects all disputes that
1991). The new rule applies only to agreements enacted after 1989. Id. at Rule (0(5).
108. 53 F.3d 807 (7th Cit. 1995).
109. Smith Barney Inc., 53 F.3d at 809.
110. 59 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir. 1995).
111. Davis, 59 F.3d at 1196.
112. Id. at 1189. In addition, the Davis court considered whether punitive damages awards by
arbitrators violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because arbi-
tration lacks procedural protections and meaningful judicial review. Id. at 1190. The Eleventh
Circuit concluded that a private arbitration contract lacks the required state action element of a due
process claim. Id. at 1191.
113. E.g., McDonnell Douglas Fin. Corp. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 858 F.2d 825,
832 (2d Cir. 1988).
114. The Second Circuit has remarked:
Simply stated, a court should compel arbitration, and permit the arbitrator to decide
whether the dispute falls within the clause, if the clause is 'broad.' In contrast, if the
clause is 'narrow,' arbitration should not be compelled unless the court determines that
the dispute falls within the clause. Specific words or phrases alone may not be determi-
native although words of limitation would indicate a narrower clause.
Prudential Lines v. Exxon Corp., 704 F.2d 59, 64 (2d Cir. 1983).
115. When a clause employs broad, encompassing language such as "arising out of," "relating
to," or "connected with," a court should order arbitration of claims involving the formation, per-
formance, modification, and termination of the contract. MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 15, at §
20.2.2.1. Courts have interpreted the following language as broad: "any and all differences, dis-
putes or controversies arising out of," Folkways Music Publishers v. Weiss, 989 F.2d 108, 111
(2nd Cir. 1993); "any dispute," Hornbeck Offshore Corp. v. Coastal Carriers Corp., 981 F.2d 752,
754-55 (5th Cir. 1993); "any controversy arising out of the handling of any of the transactions
referred to in this agreement," R.M. Perez & Assocs., Inc. v. Welch, 960 F.2d 534, 539 (5th Cir.
1992). Standard phrases seem to employ either "arising out of" or "related to/connected with"
language. "An arbitration clause covering claims 'relating to' a contract is broader than a clause
covering claims 'arising out of' a contract." International Talent Group, Inc. v. Copyright Mgmt.,
Inc., 629 F. Supp. 587, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). Language such as "arising under" necessarily limits
the arbitrable disputes to those directly related to the interpretation and performance of the con-
tract. Mediterranean Enter. v. Ssangyong Corp., 708 F.2d 1458, 1463-64 (9th Cir. 1983). "Relating
to" language extends the scope of the arbitration clause to include all disputes relating to the
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arise out of a contract to arbitration, while a narrow clause limits the arbitrable
disputes to those specifically enumerated.'"
6
When parties draft a narrow clause, they open the door to the possibility
of litigation to determine if a specific dispute falls within the scope of the
arbitration clause." 7 The American Arbitration Association, for this reason,
does not encourage utilizing overly restrictive language." 8
In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,'' the Su-
preme Court interpreted the scope of a broad arbitration clause to determine
the arbitrability of antitrust disputes. 2 ' Its holding affirmed the First
Circuit's determination that antitrust claims fell within the scope of the inter-
national contract at issue.' A later case in the Ninth Circuit extended the
Mitsubishi holding to domestic antitrust disputes.'22
B. Coors Brewing Co. v. Molson Breweries23
1. Facts
In 1985, Coors Brewing Co. (Coors) and Molson Breweries of Canada,
Ltd. (Molson) entered into an agreement allowing Molson to brew and dis-
tribute Coors's products in Canada.'24 This contract gave Molson access to
information such as Coors's trademarks, brewing processes, and marketing
data that Molson agreed to keep confidential.' 25 In 1993, Molson entered into
parties' agreement. Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi & Co., 815 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1987); Rhone-
Poulenc Specialties Chimiques v. SCM Corp., 769 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The distinc-
tion between the disputes covered by the two different types of broad phrases, "arising under" and
"relating to/connected with," rests on whether arbitral disputes involve the parties' contract itself
or the relationship that arises from their contract.
116. McDonnell Douglas Fin. Corp. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 858 F.2d 825, 832
(2d Cir. 1988) The court construed as narrow the following clause:
If the Company should disagree with any Owner's computation of the amount of the
required indemnity payment or refund ... or if any Owner should disagree with such
good faith determination of the Company that there is substantial risk, then the Compa-
ny and the Owner shall appoint an independent tax counsel to resolve the dispute and, if
the parties cannot agree to the appointment of such counsel, said independent tax coun-
sel shall be appointed by the American Arbitration Association.
Id.; see also MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 15, § 20.2.3.1.
117. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION FOR THE 1990s, at 142 (Richard J. Medalie ed., 1991) [here-
inafter COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION].
118. Id. at 143.
119. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
120. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 617. The clause stated, "All disputes, controversies or differences
which may arise between [Mitsubishi] and [Soler] out of or in relation to Articles I-B through V
of this Agreement or for the breach thereof, shall be finally settled by arbitration .... ." Id.
121. Id. at 628-40. The First Circuit had concluded that the antitrust claims closely related to
the contract since they stemmed from specific provisions in the contract. Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at
159-61. The antitrust claims resulted from Mitsubishi's concerns about trademark, reputation, and
goodwill. Because the contract addressed each of these factors, the arbitration clause applied to the
antitrust claims. Id.
122. Nghiem v. NEC Elecs., 25 F.3d 1437 (9th Cir. 1994).
123. 51 F.3d 1511 (10th Cir. 1995).
124. Coors Brewing Co., 51 F.3d at 1512. The agreement contained a broad arbitration clause
stating, "Any dispute arising in connection with the implementation, interpretation or enforcement
of this Agreement" shall be arbitrated. Id. at 1513.
125. Id.
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a partnership with Miller Brewing Company (Miller), a competitor of Coors,
and gave Miller a seat on the Molson board of directors.'26
Coors filed two separate actions against Molson:' one to arbitrate vari-
ous contract claims stemming from breach of confidentiality, and the second to
litigate various antitrust claims. 2 Molson moved to stay the antitrust pro-
ceedings pending arbitration of the contract claims.'29 The district court de-
nied the motion, and Molson sought expedited appeal on the grounds that
"Coors ha[d] dressed up its contract claims in antitrust clothes" to avoid the
arbitration clause in their agreement. 31 Coors responded that the antitrust
and contract claims were distinct, and that Coors should be able to pursue an
antitrust suit unrelated to the contract.'
3
1
Molson contended that the Supreme Court's decision in Mitsubishi indi-
cated that even if the arbitration clause did not specifically address antitrust
claims, antitrust disputes within the scope of the contract may be arbitrat-
ed.'32 Coors argued that Mitsubishi did not apply because: (1) the scope of
the arbitration clause in Mitsubishi was broad while the scope of the
Molson/Coors clause was narrow; and (2) even if antitrust claims generally
fall under the scope of the Molson/Coors agreement, Coors's specific antitrust
claims fell outside the scope of the contract and thus, were not subject to the
arbitration clause.'33
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit held that antitrust claims unrelated to the contract may
be litigated. 34 Specifically, it found that the antitrust claims regarding mar-
ket concentration did not relate to the licensing agreement and may be litigat-
ed. "'35 Antitrust claims regarding confidentiality and proprietary information,
however, did relate to the contract and, therefore, must be arbitrated. 36 In
reaching this decision, the court rejected Coors's unsupported contention that
the arbitration clause was "narrow" and instead determined that the arbitration
clause extended to the antitrust disputes within the scope of the agreement.'
126. Id.
127. Id. In particular, Coors alleged that the Miller-Molson relationship restrained trade and
lessened competition in the United States and North American beer markets. Second, Coors al-
leged that, as a result of Miller's seat on the Molson board, Miller would have access to confiden-
tial Coors's information. Finally, Coors alleged, also as a result of Miller's seat on the Molson





131. Id. Coors claimed it had two distinct interests: protecting its rights under the contract and
protecting its interest in competition in the North American beer market. It argued that the first
category of interests fell under the arbitration clause while the second did not. Id.
132. Id. at 1514.
133. Id. at 1515.
134. Id. at 1516.
135. Id. at 1517.
136. Id. at 1517-18.
137. Id. at 1515. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied in part on the all-inclusive na-
ture of the contract terms "implementation" and "enforcement." Id. By using the talasmanic word
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Next, basing its analysis on Mitsubishi, the court examined the individual
antitrust claims to determine which, if any, fell within the scope of the arbitra-
tion agreement)38 The court ruled that Coors could litigate only those anti-
trust claims that lacked a reasonable factual connection to the contract and
must arbitrate those antitrust claims that were sufficiently connected to the
contract. 39
C. Analysis
When litigating the scope of an arbitration clause, lawyers should recog-
nize that arbitration cannot be avoided by "labelling."'" As the Second Cir-
cuit put it, "In determining whether a particular claim falls within the scope of
the parties' arbitration agreement, we focus on the factual allegations in the
complaint rather than the legal causes of action asserted."'' To avoid litiga-
tion, the attorney and client should pay close attention to the specific language
of the contract.
As with any contract, the exact wording of an arbitration clause should be
the result of close consultation between attorney and client. Lawyers should
also draw on their own experiences, as well as that of others, to anticipate the
disputes that are likely to occur in the course of a legal relationship. 42 In
addition to these resources, lawyers may base arbitration clauses on existing
contracts, gaining the experience of previous drafters. However, attorneys
should take care to address the unique aspects of each situation."'
"narrow," Coors attempted to limit the scope of disputes subject to arbitration under the agreement
but did not provide any support for this claim. Id. But see JEFFREY BARIST, COMMERCIAL ARBI-
TRATION LAW AND CLAUSES: A DRAFTER's GUIDE § 3.02[B] (1994) (stating that a narrow clause
might read "[any dispute, controversy, or claim arising under this contract shall be finally settled
by arbitration").
138. Coors Brewing Co., 51 F.3d at 1515. Mitsubishi held that only antitrust claims touching
specified provisions of the agreement fell within the scope of the contract and therefore within the
agreement's arbitration clause. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 723
F.2d 155, 159-61 (1st Cir. 1983), affd in part, rev'd in part, 473 U.S. 614 (1985). The arbitration
clause in the Coors Brewing Co. agreement provided that "all disputes, controversies or differenc-
es which may arise ... out of or in relation to [specific parts of the contract]" shall be decided by
arbitration. Coors Brewing Co., 51 F.3d at 1515.
139. Coors Brewing Co., 51 F.3d at 1516. In other words, the claims that did not relate to the
continuing contractual relationship between Coors and Molson could be litigated. Id. at 1517. In
particular, Coors's claims about market concentration could be litigated while its claims regarding
confidential and proprietary information could not be arbitrated. Id.
140. For example, Molson claimed that Coors attempted to avoid arbitration by labelling
contractual claims as antitrust claims. Id. at 1513.
141. Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi & Co., 815 F.2d 840, 846 (2d Cir. 1987).
142. For example, discussing the quality and quantity of possible disputes with litigators in
the field often provides contract drafters with special "hindsight." COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION,
supra note 117, at 143-44.
143. Some of the factors which should bear on this analysis include the characteristics of the
case, attributes of the parties, features of the environment, and the presence of settlement barriers.
EDWARD A. DAUER, MANUAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: ADR LAW AND PRACTICE § 7.03 (1994).
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D. Other Circuits
A recent Second Circuit case, Collins & Aikman Products Co. v. Building
Systems"' addressed the scope of an arbitration agreement using both "aris-
ing out of' and "relating to" language.'45 The court, applying the "piecemeal
principle,"" analyzed which claims raised arbitrable issues under the broad
arbitration clause. 47 It found a claim for tortious interference with an em-
ployment contract not arbitrable because it did not "arise under" or "relate to"
the agreement that contained the arbitration clause.'" The court held that a
tort claim for trade libel fell within the scope of a broad arbitration clause,
however, because it was sufficiently related to the agreement. 49
A Ninth Circuit case, Tracer Research Corp. v. National Environmental
Services Co.,5° involved an arbitration agreement containing "arising out of'
language.'' The court held that a misappropriation of trade secrets claim
was not arbitrable, reasoning that the misappropriation constituted a wrong, in-
dependent from the licensing and nondisclosure agreement, even though the
claim would not have arisen without the agreement. 5
III. ARBITRATOR'S JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
A. Background
1. Determining If the Party Agreed to Arbitrate
Just as the terms of the contract control the scope of arbitration,'53 they
also control who must arbitrate. Courts normally use state law contract princi-
ples to decide whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a specific dispute.1
5 4
144. 58 F.3d 16 (2d Cir. 1995).
145. Collins & Aikman Prods. Co., 58 F.3d at 18. The arbitration clause specifically stated,
"Any claim arising out of or relating to this agreement shall be settled by arbitration." Id.
146. "The preeminent concern of Congress in passing the [Arbitration] Act was to enforce
private agreements ... and that concern requires that we rigorously enforce agreements to arbi-
trate, even if the result is 'piecemeal' litigation." Id. at 20 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v.
Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 22. "[T]he employment contracts were third party contracts with no logical connec-
tion to the ... agreements containing the arbitration clauses." Id.
149. Id. at 23. In summary, the court concluded:
[If the arbitration clause is broad, there arises a presumption of arbitrability; if, how-
ever, the dispute is in respect of a matter that, on its face, is clearly collateral to the
contract, then a court should test the presumption by reviewing the allegations under-
lying the dispute and by asking whether the claim alleged implicates issues of contract
construction or the parties' rights and obligations under it. If the answer is yes, then the
collateral dispute falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement; claims that present
no question involving the construction of the contract, and no questions in respect of the
parties' rights and obligations under it, are beyond the scope of the arbitration agree-
ment.
Id.
150. 42 F.3d 1292 (9th Cir. 1994).
151. Tracer Research Corp., 42 F.3d at 1295.
152. Id.
153. See supra part II.
154. First Options v. Kaplan, 115 S. Ct. 1920, 1924 (1995) (stating, however, that an impor-
tant qualification is that courts cannot assume an agreement to arbitrate absent clear and unmistak-
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In determining whether arbitration is required, the court ascertains whether
the party has a duty to arbitrate the dispute.5 ' Generally, absent an arbitra-
tion agreement, a party cannot be forced to submit a dispute to arbitration.'56
The court has the exclusive right to interpret the arbitration agreement to de-
termine who is subject to arbitration, unless the parties agree otherwise.'57 If
a court does not make its own determination that a party must arbitrate, but
accepts the arbitrator's decision binding the party to arbitrate, the court will
remand the case on appeal so that it can make its own finding.' In contrast,
once the court has made a threshold determination about arbitrability, it cannot
evaluate the arbitrator's decisions regarding the substantive merits of the case
itself."'
2. The Alter Ego Doctrine
Under certain circumstances, even a nonsignatory to an agreement may be
bound by that agreement."6 For example, a court may pierce a corporate veil
by applying the alter ego doctrine in order to reach a nonsignatory and force
them to arbitrate a dispute.'
A litigant may demonstrate the alter ego doctrine by showing that a share-
holder, overlooking their separate entities, used the corporation as an instru-
mentality to conduct his own personal affairs.'62 The alter ego doctrine stems
not from an individual's actions but from misuse of the corporate form by its
owners.'63 The advantages of limited personal liability for corporate share-
holders encourages individuals to invest, because the "corporate veil" protects
able evidence that an agreement was made).
155. AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649
(1986) (citing United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
582-83 (1960)).
156. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 478 (1989); AT&T Technologies, Inc., 475 U.S. at 648 (citing United Steelworkers v. Warrior
& Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960)).
157. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 475 U.S. at 649 (citing United Steelworkers, 363 U.S. at 582-
83). Contra Ralph Andrews Prod., Inc. v. Writers Guild of Am., 938 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir.
1991) (stating that parties may agree to submit to the arbitrator the question of arbitrability and
consent to grant the arbitrator that authority may be implied from the parties' conduct).
158. See American Bell, Inc. v. Federation of Tel. Workers, 736 F.2d 879, 886-87 (3d Cir.
1984) (remanding to the district court the question whether a party should be subject to arbitration
under veil-piercing principle).
159. Foster v. Turley, 808 F.2d 38, 42-43 (10th Cir. 1986) ("[T]he court is not authorized to
decide the merits of an issue committed by the parties to arbitration.").
160. See BARIST, supra note 137, § 4.03.
161. Id. For example, nonsignatory agents, including partners and employees may be bound to
arbitrate. See also MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 15, § 18.3.1.
162. See DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 685-87
(4th Cir. 1976) (stating that factors to consider in applying alter ego theory are: gross
undercapitalization, failure to observe corporate formalities, non-payment of dividends, the insol-
vency of the debtor corporation at the time, siphoning of funds of the corporation by the dominant
stockholder, non-functioning of other officers or directors, absence of corporate records, and the
fact the corporation is merely a facade for the operations of the dominant stockholder). See gener-
ally MARTIN M. WEINSTEIN & JAMES J. DOHENY, MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION
§ 54A.13.50 (Supp. 1995).
163. Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602, 606 (3d Cir. 1978), affd, 633 F.2d 209 (3d
Cir. 1980).
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an investor so that risk is borne by the corporate entity, not the individual
shareholder."6 As a result, individuals may be tempted to form sham corpo-
rations to avoid obligations such as arbitration.
Determining whether the corporate veil should be pierced depends largely
on the specific facts of a case. 6 The federal common-law alter ego doctrine
is based on a two-part test."6 Not every disregard of separateness justifies
piercing the corporate veil. The corporation also must be a sham.'67
B. ARW Exploration Corp. v. Aguirre"6
1. Facts
Spyridon Armenis was the president and sole shareholder of ARW Explo-
ration Corp. (ARW).'" Twenty individual investors (plaintiffs) purchased in-
terests in oil and gas ventures promoted by ARW 70 Each of the plaintiffs
entered into at least one of six joint venture agreements.' Five of the agree-
ments contained an arbitration clause and were signed by Armenis in his ca-
pacity as ARW president.' The sixth agreement, however, did not contain
an arbitration agreement, and was signed by Armenis as an individual rather
than as a representative of ARW.'73
The plaintiffs moved to compel ARW to arbitrate disputes connected with
the six agreements, and also sought, through a third-party complaint, to require
Armenis to arbitrate in an individual capacity.'74 The Oklahoma district court
initially dismissed the third-party complaint.'75 However, the court later
164. EDWARD BRODSKY & M. PATRICIA ADAMSKI, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND Di-
RECTORS: RIGHTS, DUNES AND LIABILITIES § 20:01 (1986). In this way, personal assets of an
individual shareholder cannot be reached if the corporation is liable. Id.
165. Id. § 20:02.
166. NLRB v. Greater Kansas City Roofing, 2 F.3d 1047, 1052 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that
the test consists of (1) determining whether the separate personalities and assets of the corporation
and individual are blurred from unity of interest and lack of respect given to the separate entities,
and (2) deciding whether the sanction of the corporate fiction would promote fraud, injustice, or
evasion of legal obligations). Specific factors in the first prong of the test are:
(1) whether a corporation is operated as a separate entity; (2) comingling of funds and
other assets; (3) failure to maintain adequate corporate records or minutes; (4) the nature
of the corporation's ownership and control; (5) absence of corporate assets and
undercapitalization; (6) use of the corporation as a mere shell, instrumentality or conduit
of an individual or another corporation; (7) disregard of legal formalities and the failure
to maintain an arms-length relationship among related entities; and (8) diversion of the
corporation's funds or assets to noncorporate uses.
Id. at 1052 n.6 (quoting United States v. Van Diviner, 822 F.2d 960, 965 (10th Cir. 1987)).
The second prong of the test requires inequitable behavior such as fraud, injustice, or un-
fairness. Greater Kansas Roofing, 2 F.3d at 1052; see also Doyn Aircraft v. Wylie, 443 F.2d 579
(10th Cir. 1971) (stating that when identities of the corporation and the individual merge and
separation would lead to inequitable result, veil should be pierced).
167. Kaplan v. First Options, 19 F.3d 1503, 1520-21 (3d Cir. 1994).
168. 45 F.3d 1455 (10th Cir. 1995).
169. ARW Exploration Corp., 45 F.3d at 1457.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1458.
173. Id.




consolidated the case with ARW's claim for injunctive relief, and transferred it
to an Oklahoma federal district court. 76 After oral argument, the Oklahoma
court ordered arbitration of all claims against ARW, as well as against
Armenis individually.'"' During the subsequent arbitration, the arbitrator
found that Armenis used ARW as an alter ego, and therefore decided in favor
of the plaintiffs."' On appeal, Armenis contended that the district court, not
the arbitrator, frst must pierce the ARW corporate veil and determine that
Armenis is an alter ego of ARW before he can be compelled to arbitrate as an
individual. 79
2. Decision
Although addressing the alter ego issue in its confirmation order, the
district court essentially accepted the arbitrator's factual findings that Armenis
used ARW as his alter ego.80 The Tenth Circuit held that the responsibility
for determining whether a party may be compelled to arbitrate belongs to the
court, not the arbitrator."' The Tenth Circuit held that the district court must
apply principles of corporate law, including the corporate veil doctrine, to de-
termine whether Armenis should be forced to arbitrate individually.'82
C. Analysis
ARW represented the first time the Tenth Circuit has applied the alter ego
doctrine in the arbitration context. The court followed existing circuit prece-
dent with regard to both corporate83 and arbitration law.8 4
An attorney may assist a client to avoid arbitration imposed by the alter
ego doctrine because many of the factors in the first prong of the test, mainte-
nance of separate entities, can be controlled through careful planning and
implementation of corporate structure and procedures. The second prong,
inequitable behavior, is more difficult to control. The client perpetrating a
fraud, for example, will likely manipulate otherwise adequate procedures. The
best avenue for the attorney in this situation may consist of counseling the
client on possible risks incurred from unscrupulous behavior.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1461.
179. Id. at 1458.
180. Id. at 1461.
181. Id. The district court erroneously concluded that it lacked the authority to overturn the
arbitrator's finding that Armenis used ARW fraudulently and therefore must arbitrate individually.
Id. This error resulted from mischaracterizing the rule that a district court cannot evaluate the sub-
stantive decisions of the arbitrator. Id.
182. Id. at 1460.
183. Id. at 1460-61 (citing Frank v. U.S. West, 3 F.3d 1357 (10th Cir. 1993); Quarles v.
Fuqua Indus., 504 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1974)).
184. Id. at 1461 (citing Foster v. Turley, 808 F.2d 38 (10th Cir. 1986)). However, the particu-
lar combination of issues in ARW-applying the alter ego principle in the arbitration context-had
not been addressed previously by the Tenth Circuit.
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D. Other Circuits
Other circuits did not address the alter ego concept in the arbitration con-
text during the survey period. Though beyond the time period of this survey,
the Second Circuit, with little discussion of the arbitrator's authority, remand-
ed a case in which the district court held that the arbitrator, not the court,
should determine if two companies were alter egos.'85
CONCLUSION
The decisions discussed in this Survey illustrate the increasing use of
arbitration in different contexts. In Metz, the court did not establish new prece-
dent but rather refined previous trends. For better or worse, it further extended
the reach of arbitration into the statutory arena. In Kelley, the court also culti-
vated existing precedent by further defining the scope of arbitrators' power.
By giving more power to the arbitrator, Kelly, like Metz, extended arbitration.
Coors, while not fostering the application of arbitration into new areas, refined
the interpretation of arbitration clauses, emphasizing the importance of precise
drafting. In contrast to these three cases that advance the application of arbi-
tration, ARW reinforces the limitation on the power of an arbitrator to compel
a party to arbitrate. As the use of alternative dispute resolution continues to
evolve, the courts and the legislature must work to define its role as a
substitute for adjudication.
Lisa M. Horvath
185. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, Nos. 94-9207, 9293, 9209, 7183, 1995 WL 540584, at
*3 (2d Cir. 1995).
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